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Abstract
One of the most interesting developments in the theory of the firm
has been the introduction of a utilities function which includes
personal or group goals of executives in addition to the classical
profit motive. Considerable debate has raged over the economic
assumption that the large corporation, through the decisions of its
managers, attempts to maximize its profits. Closely related to the
notion of profit maximization is expense preference behavior of managers
which would indicate a "preference" for expenses over firm profit.
This study examines the market structure effects on expense
preference behavior and, for the first time, tests are made using data
which unambiguously reflect market structure differences between firms
in the sample. The results provide evidence which is contrary to the
expense preference hypothesis.
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MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND EXPENSE PREFERENCE BEHAVIOR
Economists have long been interested in managerial motivation. As
Ciscel and Carroll (4) recently explain, considerable debate has raged
over the economic assumption that the large corporation, through the
decisions of its managers, attempts to maximize its profits. Closely
related to the notion of profit maximization is expense preference
behavior of managers which would indicate a "preference" for expenses
over firm profits. The tension between profit maximization behavior
and expense preference behavior of managers has been recently discussed
by Lamer (12)
.
One condition which could affect a firm's ability and willingness
to engage in expense preference behavior is the market structure in
which it operates. This study examines the market structure effects
on expense preference behavior and, for the first time, tests are made
using data which unambiguously reflect market structure differences.
The results provide evidence contrary to the expense preference hypoth-
esis and the findings are quite consistent with the previous research
of Ciscel and Carroll (4), Lamer (12), and Rhoades (21).
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of managerial discretion in the operations of large
corporations has been well recognized. The separation of ownership from
control and imperfection in goods and/or capital markets permit the
managers of large firms to pursue non-profit maximizing goals—salary,
power, security, prestige, etc. Indeed, one of the most interesting
developments in the theory of the firm has been the introduction of a
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utility function that includes personal or group goals of executives in
addition to the classical profit motive (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 20, 21). One
such approach that has received substantial attention in recent years
is the expense preference theory, which has its theoretical origins in
the works of Williamson (24, 25) and Rees (20).
The expense preference theory views the firm as maximizing utility
by pursuing non-profit-maximizing policies. In particular, it posits
that managers have positive preference for staff expense, managerial
emoluments, and funds available for discretionary use and they increase
such expenses beyond profit maximizing levels (6, 20, 24, 25). In its
narrow operational form, the expense preference theory postulates that
monopoly firms with managerial discretion will hire more staff and/or
pay higher managerial wages than will competitive profit-maximizing
firms, ceteris paribus (6). The expense preference theory hypothesizes
that firms in less competitive markets will, other things being equal,
hire more staff and/or pay higher wages than will the firms in more
competitive markets (24).
Though Williamson himself emphasized the importance of empirical
studies in ascertaining the existence of expense preference behavior in
his early work (24, 25), much of the serious empirical investigations
of the subject have only recently begun. Edwards developed an empiri-
cal framework capable of testing the expense preference hypothesis (6)
and applied it to banking markets. The original research, as well as
the work of several researchers later applying similar frameworks and
data, found the number of employees (or the amount of wage and salary
expenses) in markets possessing monopoly power to be higher than in
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corapetitive markets (6, 8, 9). One exception is Rhoades who, using a
banking data set and models quite different from Edwards' , found little
statistical evidence to support the expense preference hypothesis (21).
II. BACKGROUND ON PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORKS
Most of the empirical studies after (24) have focused on the banking
industry for the following reasons:
First, the regulated status and public interest character of banking
are both likely to create expense-preference behavior in managers who
prefer not to show exceptionally high profits. Previous research has
pointed out that a discretionary view of managerial behavior such as
the expense preference theory is particularly appropriate to regulated
industries (1, 21, 22), where the abridgement of property rights is
acute and managers may prefer not to reveal excessive profits. Second-
ly, the market structures in which banks operate are frequently charac-
terized by monopoly and oligopolistic imperfections: the weakness or
absence of competitive pressure may permit managers to pursue their own
non-profit-maximizing goals. Also, commercial banks provide a sample
of relatively homogeneous units in terras of basic demand and supply
conditions confronting the firms (6, 20).
In developing his model, Edwards assumed (a) that expense preference
behavior is manifested in the employment of labor (or incurring labor
expense) in excess of the profit maximizing levels, (b) that three-firm
concentration ratios constitute reasonable indexes of monopoly power,
and (c) that the concentration-monopoly relationship is discrete rather
than continuous; or, that some threshold level of concentration must be
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reached before firms recognize their mutual interdependence and begin
to coordinate their activities (5).
Edwards' demand-for-labor equation designed to test the expense-
preference behavior then is written (In = natural logs):
(1) In L * b„ + b„ In W + b. In r + b, In Y + h M
2 3 4
where L is the number of employees, W is the wage rate, r is the cost
of capital, Y is a shift variable representing all nonprice factors
that affect demand, and M is the monopoly dummy variable which equals
one when concentration is above the required threshold level and zero
otherwise; b_, b
,
b-, b, , and h are the usual constant parameters. If
the coefficient h is positive and significant then the expense preference
hypothesis is affirmed. Equation (1) developed by Edwards forms the
basis of the empirical studies that have found evidence supporting the
expense preference theory in banking (6, 8, 9).
III. A TEST OF THE EXPENSE PREFERENCE THEORY USING ELECTRIC UTILITY DATA
We noted earlier that previous researchers of expense preference
behavior have explained that, for several reasons, the banking industry
provides conditions and data particularly well suited for their empirical
work. First, managerial behavior expected by the expense preference
theory seems particularly appropriate in regulated industries. Second,
monopoly or oligopolistic market imperfections, homogeneity in supply
and demand conditions, and the public interest character of the banking
business are also cited as important characteristics.
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It is obvious, however, that the above characteristics, which made
banking the target of empirical investigation of the expense preference
hypothesis, are even more apparent in the electric utility industry.
The industry is regulated, it is of public interest character, is com-
monly characterized by the separation of ownership from management, and
2
it is quite homogeneous in demand and supply conditions. If these
conditions lead to expense preference behavior in banking, one would
also expect for them to lead to expense preference behavior by managers
of electric utility firms.
Primeaux (18) has shown that, not withstanding the popular belief
that electric utilities are natural monopolies, there are a number of
U.S. cities in which two electric utilities serve the same market and
directly compete with each other. Equipped with this knowledge, we
test the expense preference theory using a sample of electric utilities
from the cities in which duopolistic competition exists combined with
another carefully selected sample of paired electric utilities from
cities served by a single monopoly electric utility. This test has
some methodological advantage over the banking studies which followed
Edwards' framework (6, 8, 9).
Our electric utility data set consists of two rather distinct sub-
sets of firms, monopoly firms and duopoly firms. Thus, it is no longer
necessary to assume that a concentration ratio is a suitable index of
monopoly power nor that the concentration-monopoly relationship is
discrete rather than continuous; these rather strong assumptions were
necessary in previous studies. Furthermore, it was hoped that this
additional test of expense preference behavior would shed additional
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light on our meager empirical knowledge of the theory; that knowledge
has been developed almost exclusively from banking industry data.
A proper test of the expense preference theory would compare a
group of firms which are expected to be profit raaximizers with another
group which is able to deviate from profit maximization and survive.
In the sample used here, both groups of firms are municipal utility
firms; thus, one might raise two questions regarding the appropriate-
ness of the sample. First, whether these municipal utility firms are
profit raaximizers and second, if so, would they ever deviate from
profit maximizing behavior. These two questions are given serious
consideration in the following discussion.
As discussed in Primeaux (18), the common impression is that muni-
cipally owned firms are nonprofit, public-serving firms, however, their
profit performance indicates that they are indeed profit oriented. For
example, after discussing the level of profit for privately owned firms
from 1950 to 1961, W. G. Shepherd (23) explained that "Despite the com-
mon impression, the average rates of return for publicly owned electric
suppliers (other than Federal projects) have been almost identical with
those of private profit rates." Moreover, data from the Federal Power
Commission indicate that municipally owned electric utility firms seek
profits. These data show that in 1968 net income amounted to 15.4 per-
cent of sales for privately owned electric utilities and 22.3 percent
3
for municipal electric utilities. P. Mann (14) found that municipally
owned firms in his study earned a 7.14 percent rate of return on net
investment while privately owned firms earned 6.74 percent. M. Colberg
(5) has also discussed the profit orientation of municipally owned
-7-
utility firms. So the answer to the first question is that municipal
utilities, contrary to the general impression, are profit oriented
institutions.
The second question concerns whether these firms would ever deviate
from profit maximizing behavior. The sample is composed of two subsets
of firms; one subset composed of monopolists, the second subset com-
posed of firms facing competition. Primeaux (18) presents data which
show that monopoly firms tend to be less efficient than firms facing
competition because of the absence of the spur to efficiency in a mo-
nopoly environment. The answer to the second question, thus, is also
affirmative: municipal electric utilities deviate from the profit
maximizing behavior in a market environment in which there is less
competition.
IV. THE NATURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DATA
The electric utility sample of this study is composed of municipally-
owned electric utilities listed in Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric
Utilities in the United States , 1964 through 1968. More recent data
was not used because (a) the number of cities in which two electric
utilities compete has been shrinking through time (15), and (b) the
inclusion of more recent years would, due to the enormous changes in
energy cost, etc., make the data of questionable value for comparison
purposes (14, 15, 17). Faced with the option of older but better
quality data that include a greater number of firms and the newer but
less homogeneous data that include fewer firms, we chose the former
(15).
4
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Ilead-to-head competition actually exists in those communities with
two electrical systems and consumers have a choice of being served by
one firm or the other. In these communities, there are dual distribu-
tion systems, two administrative offices and frequently two sets of
generating facilities, except in some instances where one of the firms
purchases its power requirements. The essential point is that two
distinct companies exist in competitive cities providing electric ser-
vice to consumers. The reader who is unfamiliar with these kinds of
situations can obtain more information by referring to Primeaux (18).
In those cities with two rival electric systems, the usual arrange-
ment is that a privately owned firm competes with a publicly owned
firm. Primeaux (18) has explained that since privately owned firms
operate in more than one city, it is not possible to obtain data allo-
cated only to a city in which they compete. Consequently, previous
research of direct electric utility competition has compared publicly
owned firms of the competitive subset with another subset of publicly
owned firms from monopoly markets. That is the procedure followed
here; Table I shows the composition of the sample.
Time series and cross-section data were pooled to enlarge our
source of basic information and this procedure produced 198 complete
sample observations. An analysis of variance test was applied to
ascertain whether pooling of the time series and cross section data
was justified. The test results revealed that pooling was permissible,
since the calculated F-statistics indicated that the hypothesis of
unshifted parameters could not be rejected.
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Table I. Municipally
Included
Owned Electric Utilities
in the Study
Duopoly Firms
Bessemer, Alabama
Tarrant City, Alabama
Anchorage, Alaska
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Maquoketa, Iowa
Hagerstown, Maryland
Allegan, Michigan
Bay City, Michigan
Dowagiac, Michigan
Ferrysburg, Michigan
Traverse City, Michigan
Zeeland, Michigan
Kennett, Missouri
Poplar Bluff, Missouri
Trenton, Missouri
Lincoln, Nebraska
Cleveland, Ohio
Columbus, Ohio
Piqua, Ohio
Springfield, Oregon
Greer, South Carolina
Sioux Falls, South Dakota
Garland, Texas
Matched monopoly firms
Florence, Alabama
Scottsboro, Alabama
a
Richmond, Indiana
Algona, Iowa
Bristol, Virginia
Niles, Michigan
Wyandotte, Michigan
Hillsdale, Michigan
Lansing, Michigan
Sturgis, Michigan
Petoskey, Michigan
Carthage, Missouri
Rolla, Missouri
Columbia, Missouri
Marshall, Missouri
Omaha, Nebraska
Springfield, Illinois
Anderson, Indiana
Logansport, Indiana
Eugene, Oregon
Greenwood, South Carolina
Watertown, South Dakota
.
Springfield, Missouri
San Antonio, Texas
No suitable matching city can be found in Alaska.
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V. THE MODEL: A TEST OF EXPENSE PREFERENCE BEHAVIOR IN ELECTRIC
UTILITIES
Several difficulties were encountered in our attempt to adapt
Edwards' expense preference equation to the analysis of electric util-
ity data. First, data for total wages and salaries or total employment
were unavailable for most of the individual electric utilities included
in the sample. Our search for a narrow operational definition of elec-
tric utility managers' expense preference led us to the "sales and ad-
ministrative expenses" reported in Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric
Utilities in the United States . This expense category seems to be the
one most likely to reflect the discretionary influence of electric util-
ity managers who may harbor expense preferences. Additional support
for our choice of administrative and sales expense as the variable that
would indicate expense preference of electric utility managers comes
from Williamson (24) in his original 1963 article. In his study of
expense preference, Williamson considered "general administrative and
selling expense" as a good proxy for measuring the level of staff
activity in the firm.
Another difficulty in adopting Edwards' expense preference model
came about because of differences in the natures of the electric utility
and the banking industries; these differences necessitated the intro-
duction of an entirely new set of variables in the estimating equation.
Our analytical framework suggests the following functional form:
Expense = f( total sales, sales composition, market
density, wage rates, monopoly-competition
status, state in which the firm is located)
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The OLS multiple regression equation includes the following vari-
ables; where all variables except the dummy variables are in natural
logarithms.
Dependent variable:
EXP = Total sales and administrative expenses
Explanatory variables:
TKWH = Total kilowatt hour sale (millions of kwh)
QMIX = Sales composition or output mix: residential
KWH sale/total KWH sale
RKWH = Residential KWH sale per customer (thousands of
kwh) : control for residential market density
INCOM = Per capita disposable income: a proxy for
wage and salary rates
DM = Monopoly dummy: monopoly = 1, competition =
State dummy variables:
DAL = Alabama
DAK = Alaska
DIN = Indiana
DIO = Iowa
DML = Maryland
DMI = Michigan
DMO = Missouri
DNB = Nebraska
DOH = Ohio
DSC = South Carolina
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DSD = South Dakota
DTX Texas
In short, the equation to be tested is:
In EXP = b + b In TKWH + b In QMIX + b In RKWH
12
+ b. In INCOM + DM Z SD.
4
1-1 X
where DS ' s are the dummy variables for the twelve states included in
the model. Expected relationships between the sales and administrative
costs and the explanatory variables are as follows:
3EXP/3TKWH > 0, 3EXP/3QMIX > 0, 3EXP/3RKWH < 0, and 3EXP/3INCOM > 0.
The sign of the coefficient of the monopoly dummy DM is the crucial one
for testing the expense preference behavior in the electric utility
industry; a positive sign would indicate that the monopoly utility firm
incurs a greater administrative and sales expense than its duopoly
counterpart; and, therefore, this would support the expense preference
hypothesis; a negative sign would reject it. The signs of the state
dummy cannot be known a priori .
VI. TESTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table II presents the results of the OLS regression analysis based
on the model specification of Section V. The equation performs rather
2
well: the adjusted R is high (.868), suggesting that we are probably
not omitting important explanatory variables. The signs of TKWH,
QMIX, RKWH, and INCOM conform to theoretical expectations and are all
significant; INCOM, however, is significant only at the 12 percent
-13-
Table II. Expense Preference—Market Structure Relationship
for Municipally Owned Electric Utilities, 1964-68
Explanatory Regression Standard Significance
Variables Coefficient
1.003
Error Level
TKWH .046 .000
QMIX .492 .113 .000
RKWH -.476 .135 .001
INCOM .417 .060 .123
DM -.164 .085 .056
Alabama -.512 .187 .007
Alaska .545 .363 .135
Indiana .316 .194 .106
Iowa .139 .201 .488
Maryland -.407 .188 .031
Missouri .499 .116 .000
Nebraska -.249 .273 .362
Ohio .210 .153 .171
Oregon -.130 .256 .616
S. Carolina .115 .232 .619
S. Dakota -1.313 .225 .000
Texas -.221 .197 .264
Constant -4.130 2.087 .049
Summary Statistics:
R
2
.868
198
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level. Income is probably insignificant because of the role played by
the state dummies included in the model; various state dummies serve as
shift variables that account for differences in income level, regulatory
practices, etc. When the same regression was run without state dummies,
the standard error of the income coefficient became much smaller and
its significance level became very high (.000). The monopoly dummy DM
is negative and is significant at the 5 to 6 percent level.
The significant DM variable shows that sales and administrative ex-
pense are lower for a monopoly electric utility firm than for a duopoly
electric firm facing direct competition from a rival in the same market.
This result is certainly not consistent with the predictions of the
expense preference hypothesis. Consequently, our test of the expense
preference theory, based on heretofore untested electric utility data,
offers evidence which contradicts the theory and some previous empiri-
cal results.
Examination of the state dummies reveals that they are significant
only for Alabama, Maryland, Missouri, and South Dakota. Signs of the
state dummies for Alabama, Maryland, and South Dakota are negative; this
indicates that the sales and administrative costs of electric utility
firms located in these states are lower than those of the firms located
in Michigan (the reference state whose dummy is omitted in setting up
the regression equation). The sign of the Missouri state dummy, on the
other hand, is positive and indicates a higher level of sales and admin-
istrative costs for firms in that state than in Michigan.
Since a recent study found that advertising expenditures were larger
for competitive firms than for monopoly firms (15), one might ask if our
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findings are biased against the expense preference theory. This ques-
tion could arise because we use sales and administrative expenses as
the dependent variable in our analysis. In anticipation of this ques-
tion, we tested our model using administrative expenses alone as the
dependent variable (advertising was excluded) . The results changed
very little in terms of the signs and magnitudes of various regression
coefficients.
There are two reasons for using sales and administrative expenses
as the dependent variable. First, a number of utility firms did not
even report sales expenses as a separate item, giving rise to suspicion
that sales expense (which amounts to less than 10 percent of the com-
bined sales and administrative expenses in most cases) may have been
combined with other administrative expenses. Secondly, as mentioned
earlier, Williamson expressed the view that general administrative and
selling expense serve as a good proxy for staff expense (24). This
insight provides an additional incentive to include sales expense in
the specification of our dependent variable.
Our findings that administrative and sales expenses were lower for
electric utility firms operating as monopolists than for firms that com-
peted in duopolistic markets were rather unexpected. The results were
surprising because Primeaux's 1975 study (18) found that average total
costs of electric utility firms was lower for duopoly firms facing com-
petition than for firms in monopoly situations. Our results, however,
are really not inconsistent with the earlier findings reported by
Primeaux. The results reported here together with the earlier findings
do mean that the cost differences found in the earlier study cannot be
attributed to managerial slack and expense preference behavior.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The most recent empirical tests of the expense preference hypothe-
sis have been based almost exclusively on banking data. In this paper,
we developed a model applicable to electric utility firms and tested
the expense preference theory. Tests based on our sample have two
important advantages. First, they do not need to rely on the assump-
tion that concentration ratios are meaningful indexes of market power.
The second advantage is that the assumption that the concentration-
monopoly relationship is discrete is unnecessary.
Overall, our findings indicate that the monopoly firms In our sam-
ple do not indulge in larger sales and administrative expenses than
firms in the same industry facing competition; indeed, the competitive
firms engaged in higher expenditures. The results of this investiga-
tion, therefore, offer evidence contrary to the expense preference
hypothesis and are quite consistent with the earlier empirical research
of Ciscel and Carroll (4), Larner (12), and Rhoades (21), even though
those studies employed different data and statistical models.
-17-
FOOTNOTES
Edwards gives an additional reason for choosing the banking
industry. That is, the findings of past studies indirectly hint at
the possible existence of expense preference behavior in banking. He
explains that a number of studies show small positive correlations
between monopoly power and bank prices (interest rates) but the lack
of any "systematic relationship between monopoly power and bank prof-
itability." Other studies find that increased competition does not
diminish bank profitability but does lower bank operating costs. Such
findings suggest that "the managements of (monopolistic) banks appro-
priate part of the profits through expense-preference behavior: by
paying themselves higher salaries, hiring excessive staff, or being
lax in their supervision, all of which may enhance their utility (and
increase costs) while lowering reported profitability" (6).
2
The privately owned firms in the industry are regulated by state
regulatory commissions. Publicly owned firms, which are the firms
discussed in the empirical part of this study, are regulated by some
sort of regulatory board, at the local level in the communities they
serve.
3
Information obtained from the Federal Power Commission, January 8,
1970. As indicated in the discussion which follows, the timing of this
information conforms with the sample years.
4
' There may have been a break in structure between the period
yielding the statistical prior information and that yielding the sample
information, in which case one wants pure estimates from the period of
interest rather than mongrel estimates averaging two sets of
parameters" (11, p. 226).
We experimented with a model that included two additional vari-
ables: one to account for the commercial and industrial KWH sale per
customer and the other, the ratio of total KWH purchased over total
KWH sale. The latter variable was included in this experiment because
some studies have shown that it may be more economical for a firm to
purchase power than to generate it (10, 18). The addition of these
two variables, however, hardly changed the statistical results of our
model: The adjusted R^ was .867 as opposed to the .868 of the origi-
nal model, signs of all coefficients remained unchanged, and the values
of coefficients and standard errors hardly changed. Furthermore, the
added variables turned out to be statistically insignificant.
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One might ask whether raulticolinearity is of concern in our model.
Note that all estimated coefficients had theoretically expected signs
and standard errors of all variables except income were rather small.
The text explains the reason for the large standard error of the
income variable. Moreover, when the model was reestiraated with a few
cases deleted, the signs of all coefficients remained the same and
their magnitudes changed very little. As mentioned above, the esti-
mates remained rather stable when some additional variables were added
to the model. There is little reason, therefore, to suspect that
raulticollinearity is affecting the results of this research.
-19-
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